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More Revelations About Mayaguez 
(and its Secret Cargo) 
by Jordan]. Paust· 
PAUST ON THE MAYAGUEZ: EDITORS' INTRODUCTION·· 
In May 1975, the u.s. merchant ship Mayaguez was held captive by forces of the 
Cambodian Government for three days. The incident has produced a lively controversy 
among international legal scholars. 
Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Houston has written extensively over the last 
few years on the issues presented by the Mayaguez incident. In 1976, Professor Paust 
discussed the legality of governmental actions surrounding the Mayaguez incident. His 
analysis elicited a critical response from the State Department. The ensuing debate is con-
tinued here. 
The present article examines the litigation engendered by the incident. Such litigation in-
volves suits brought by crew members of the Mayaguez against the owner of the merchant 
vessel and against the U. S. Government. Claims against the private shippers have general-
ly been settled while claims against the Government are still pending. The suits are in-
teresting for two reasons. First, new facts surrounding the incident have been revealed 
which have a bean'ng on the legality of the actions taken by the two governments. Second, 
the suits are grounded in part on a novel application of international law. Specifically, 
crew meTflbers have alleged that affirmative duties in admiralty law were breached by viola-
tions of international law. 
The following summarizes the facts of the incident as recounted by Professor Paust in his 
1976 article and briefly restates the major points of the debate between Professor Paust and 
the State Department. 
On May 12, 1975, at 3:18 a.m. (Washington, D.C. time), the merchant ship 
Mayaguez and her crew were stopped and seized by forces of the Cambodian Government. 
This action took place off the Poulo Wai Islands, a group of small rocky islands about 60 
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miles off the Cambodian coast and 30 miles from the Cambodian island of Koh Tang. At 
the time of the seizure, sovereignty over the Poulo Wai Islands was claimed by three states: 
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand. However, Cambodia, the closest of the three nations 
in terms of geographic proximity, was in control. The seizure took place within 12 miles of 
the coast and, therefore, within an area claimed by Cambodia to be within its territorial 
waters. The Cambodian Government later justified the seizure on claims of national securi-
ty. The Government cited the fact that two or three ships operating as fishing vessels entered 
the tmitorial waters daily for the purpose of espionage activity. 
Following the seizure, the crew was questioned to determine whether the Mayaguez was 
armed and whether the ship was transporting arms. The crew's possible affiliation with 
the C.I.A. or the F.B.I. was also investigated. The period of detention continuedfor ap-
proximately 64 hours. 
President Ford learned of the seizure four hours after it took place, and met with the Na-
tional Security Council that day at noon to discuss the matter. Following the meeting, Press 
Secretary Nessen issued a statement claiming that the seizure had taken place on the high 
seas. The statement, which characterized the action as piracy, demanded the immediate 
release of the ship and warned that serious consequences would follow if the demand went 
unheeded. Messages were sent to the Cambodians through People's Republic of China con-
veying a 24-hour ultimatum for the crew's release. 
On the morning after the seizure, the Cambodians began to move the crew to the 
mainland. The United States, fearing that it would be difficult to get the crew back once it 
reached the Cambodian mainland, launched an air attack on the Cambodian naval vessels 
escorting the crew oj the Mayaguez to the mainland. Three Cambodian patrol craft were 
destroyed and four others were damaged and immobilized. The efforts to deter the transfer of 
the crew to the mainland were partially successful. The crew was brought ashore on some 
nearby islands. 
Approximately 14 hours after its air attack, the United States turnedfor the first time to 
the United Nations. Subsequently, Secretary General Waldheim appealed to the nations in-
volved to resolve the dispute peacifully. Later the same day, i.e., about two and one half 
days after the Mayaguez was captured, President Ford decided to dispatch the Marines. 
Shortly after the appropriate order lift the Pentagon, the President met with congressional 
leaders to iriform them oj his decision. Independently of these events, the crew lift the 
mainland to be returned to their ship. Nevertheless, Marine assault forces landed on Tang 
Island and American planes bombed Ream airport on the Cambodian mainlandjust after 
the crew had been released. 
In his article, The Seizure and Recovery oj the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L..J. 774 (1976), 
the author concluded that: (1) the incident did not take place in international waters; (2) 
there was reasonable justification for a beliif that, under the circumstances the passage of the 
Mayaguez through these waters was not "innocent;" (3) the seizure oj the Mayaguez by 
the Cambodians was legal under international law; and (4) the actions taken by the United 
States in response to the seizure were contrary to international law. The author took note oj 
Cambodia's viable claim to sovereignty over the islands - a claim which was disputed by 
Vietnam and Thailand. He further examined the reasonable inference that the Mayaguez 
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was engaged in espionage activity or carrying weapons or military matenel, an inference 
which could have justified the seizure of the Mayaguez in the context of the Cambodian 
revolution. Finally, Paust argued that U. S. actions were unreasonable and inconsistent 
with international law and ordinary Us. practice under the circumstances. 
Michael David Sandler, Special Assistant to the Legal Advisor of the Department of 
State, responded to Professor Paust's version of the facts and the law in CORRE-
SPONDENCE, 85 YALE L..J. 203 (1976). These areas of disagreement included: (1) 
Whether the Mayaguez had been travelling in an international sea lane; (2) Whether the 
presence of the Mayaguez was objectively menacing and non-innocent; (3) whether the 
Cambodians had the right to stop the ship for inspection; (4) whether the Us. Government 
reasonably believed that use of force was necessary to protect American lives; and (5) 
whether the air attacks were justified in order to reduce the ability of the Cambodian forces 
on the mainland to threaten Us. Marines then withdrawing. 
In thefollowing, Professor Paust continues his examination into the Mayaguez incident. 
This examination incorporates newly revealed facts gleaned .from the prosecution of van·ous 
lawsuits against the owners of the Mayaguez and the U_S. Government by members of the 
crew. 
More Revelations About Mayaguez 
(and its Secret Cargo) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the publication of the author's article, The Seizure and Recovery of the 
Mayaguez,1 the letter-reply by an attorney in the State Department, Michael 
D. Sandler,2 and the author's letter-response,! significant new facts concern-
ing the Mayaguez incident have been revealed. Such facts include, inter alia, 
disclosures related to the location of the Mayaguez at the time of its seizure, the 
appearance of the ship, the actual cargo on board the ship and the knowledge 
of crew members about prior Cambodian searches of vessels. These matters 
have come to light as a result of the prosecution of various multimillion dollar 
law suits brought by crew members against the United States and the Sea-
Land Service Corporation, the prior owners of the once famous Mayaguez.· 
Several such lawsuits, consolidated as Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 5 
were brought as suits in admiralty in the San Francisco Superior Court of the 
I. Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Paust, Seizure). 
2. Sandler, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 203 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sandler]. 
3. Paust, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 207 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Paust, Correspondence]. 
4. The Mayaguez was sold for scrap in February 1979. Ste, e.g., Remunber the Mayaguez? Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, Fed. 23, 1979, at 6, col. 1. 
5. Rappennecker v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., No. 691-717, consolidated with 691-718,719, 
720, 721 and 695-952 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 26, 1977). See Brieffor Plaintiffs [hereinafter 
cited as Brief for Plaintiffs); Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement [hereinafter cited as 
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State of California. The prosecution of these suits entailed extensive discovery 
and, as a result, new facts were added to the record. Depositions were taken of 
several persons, including certain crew members. In addition, the usual 
litigant documents were prepared and filed. Such documents included trial 
briefs and conference settlement statements. In June 1977, a court-approved 
settlement of these initial lawsuits was finalized under which the plaintiffs were 
awarded large sums of money to be paid by the Sea-Land Corporation. 6 This 
settlement functionally ended much of the plaintiff-initiated discovery of addi-
tional facts about the Mayaguez incident. 
In addition to the settlement reached in the California court, in February 
1979 another settlement was reached concerning most of the state court ac-
tions brought by crew members who had not initially joined in the litigation 
against Sea-Land. 7 This second settlement awarded substantial sums to many 
of those plaintiffs who had not previously been compensated. Thus, most of 
the plaintiff crew members have received some compensation. 
Other lawsuits involving consolidated crew member claims against the V. S. 
Government are still pending in the Federal District Court in San Francisco. 
Doubt remains, however, whether it will be financially worthwhile to pursue 
litigation in the future against an uncooperative, even secretive, V.S. Govern-
ment. Moreover, a recent memorandum opinion and order by District Judge 
Schwarzer may have taken some of the wind out of the plaintiffs' sails, at least 
for the time being.s Consequently, it has been questioned whether the plain-
tiffs will pursue their claims against the V nited States. 9 
Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement]. A set of companion suits is still pending in federal 
court. See note 8 infra. 
6. See letter from Atty. M. Jarvis to the author (Oct. 21, 1977), adding: the cases "were settled 
for the total sum of258,OOO .... Separate formal judgments were entered in each of these actions 
and theEejudgments have already been paid." The federal cases are still pending. See note 8 infra. 
7. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK, No.6, Apr, 1979, at 
2-3. Settlement was for $130,000, bringing the total to $388,000. 
8. Rappennecker v. United States, Nos. C-76-0298-WWS, C-76-0422-WWS, 
C-7?-0565-WWS, C-77-0939-WWS (N.D. Cal., Jul. 8, 1980) (Memorandum of Opinion and 
Order) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Opinion and Order]. The court's order granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment "with respect to all claims arising out of the military 
operations" engaged in by the United States, but allowed plaintiffs to test their claim concerning 
a U.S. failure to warn ships about dangers in the area where the Mayaguez was seized. See id. at 
11, lines 9-12. Trial is scheduled for January 1981. The order was premised on the court's 
understanding that such matters present non-justiciable political questions. However, such a 
premise is erroneous, as explained in more detail in Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law 
of the Land? - Foreign Affairs and National Security Re-Examined, (1980) (available from the author at 
the following address: University of Houston, Central Campus, Houston, Texas 77004). As 
noted in the preceding article, several cases have examined the propriety of Executive acts taken 
abroad, even when military force was used in time of war and, thus, when Executive power is ad-
mittedly at its highest. As explained therein, such cases have addressed Executive violations of in-
ternational law and have voided illegal acts or otherwise issued sanctions against violations of 
supreme federal law. !d. 
9. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK, No.6, Apr. 1979, at 
2-3. 
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The import of the new record established by these lawsuits reaches far 
beyond the parties directly involved. Here, the inquiry begins by outlining an 
interesting new precedent set by the Mayaguez lawsuits, one that involves the 
integration of international law into plaintiffs' claims in admiralty for com-
pensatory and punitive damages. Next, there are sections that will detail new-
ly revealed facts concerning the location and the appearance of the ship, its 
secret cargo, and the prior knowledge possessed by the ship's operators con-
cerning recent hostilities in the area. Quite clearly, knowledge of these new 
facts is necessary in order adequately to assess the propriety with which the 
governments of the United States and Cambodia conducted themselves dur-
ing the course of the incident. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Mayaguez lawsuits were based in part on a novel theory ofliability in ad-
miralty law. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that certain violations of inter-
national law were, in context, interconnected with a violation by Sea-Land of 
the affirmative duty imposed by admiralty law to protect the health and safety 
of crew members. In the California cases, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendant's Master (Captain Miller) was derelict in this dutylO by "recklessly 
venturing into known dangerous and hostile waters of foreign sovereignty 
(Cambodia)" 11 and otherwise" inviting the capture" 12 ofthe Mayaguez by sail-
ing within 1.75 miles of an island claimed by Cambodia 13 without flying a 
flag,14 and under other circumstances which clearly show "that defendant's 
ship was neither in international waters nor engaged in 'innocent passage' at 
the time and place of her seizure and detention by the Cambodians, as war-
ranted under the established Treaty and the applicable international law." 15 
10. See Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 5, at 2-4. 
11. See id. at 10, line 26, to id. at 11, line 2. See also id. at 13, lines 13-16. 
12. Id. at 27, lines 17-18. 
13. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 2, line 1; id. at 4, lines 13, 20; 
id. at 17, line 16, to id. at 18, line 6; id. at 44, lines 8-10. In the Federal District Court order of 
July 8, 1980, the court declared that the vessel "passed within 3 miles of the Poulo Wai 
Islands .... " See Memorandum of Opinion and Order, supra note 8, at 2, lines 25-6. In the 
Government's Answer to Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, Rappennecker v. Sea-Land Serv-
ices, Inc., No. 691-717, consolidated with 691-718,719,720,721 and 695-952 (Cal. Super. Ct., 
filed Apr. 26, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Government's Answer), the Government admitted that 
it knew that Cambodia had claimed and occupied Poulo Wai. See id. at 7-8; and irifra note 37. 
14. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 5, at 19, line 19-20; and Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference 
Statement, supra note 5, at 7, lines 6-7. To these claims, the United States responded on January 
28, 1980: "Defendant does admit ... that on May 12, 1975, the Mayaguez was painted at least 
partially black and that it is common for merchants vessels not to fly a flag while sailing between 
ports"" See Government's Answer, supra note 13, at 4, lines 14-19. 
15. Brieffor Plaintiffs, supra note 5, at 19, lines 21-25, citing Paust, Seizure, supra note 1. The 
brief included a copy of the Paust article as plaintiffs' Exhibit B. Brieffor Plaintiffs, supra note 5, 
at 7, lines 5-12. The "Treaty" referred to is the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 15 U.S.T. 1606. In the federal suits, the Government 
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The plaintiffs' pretrial statement of February 22, 1977 denied defendant Sea-
Land's claim that the Mayaguez was sailing on the high seas in international 
navigable waters when seized. 16 Additional specific references to violations of 
international law were made at several points in the Plaintiffs' Settlement 
Conference Statement. 17 
The plaintiffs' claims before the California court were not grounded solely 
on claims to compensatory and punitive damages for violations of interna-
tional law as such. The plaintiffs argued that by violating international law 
and otherwise "recklessly venturing into Cambodian waters" and general 
areas of hosility, the corporate defendant, through the actions of the Master of 
the Mayaguez, "clearly invited the seizure and detention of the 
MA YAGUEZ"18 and thus subjected the crew to serious injury or death in 
violation of relevant principles of maritime law. The plaintiffs, apparently, 
were not ready to argue that violations of international law by private corpora-
tions should automatically lead to recovery of damages by certain victims of 
those violations. Such an argument is entirely possible, at least where viola-
tions of the constitutional rights of the victims also occur in connection with 
the violation of general human rights and/or other international norms. 19 
There was some reference made to the "human rights" of the crew.20 
However, it does not appear that the plaintiffs were ready to argue claims for 
compensation on the basis of serious deprivations of the human rights and/or 
the civil rights of the plaintiff crew members.21 Again, the nature of the 
has denied the allegations of violations of international law . See Government's Answer, supra note 
13, at 16-17. 
16. Pretrial Statement of Plaintiffs, at 4, lines 16-19, Rappennecker v. Sea-Land Services, 
Inc., No. 691-717, consolidated with 691-718,719,720,721, and 695-952 (Cal. Super Ct., filed 
Apr. 26, 1977). See Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 4, lines 1-3, 
11-22. In the federal suits, the Government has denied allegations that the Mayaguez was captured 
in territorial seas. See note 15 supra. 
17. See generally Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 4, 18. Such 
references include: "navigating the vessel in violation of the Treaty," at 18, lines 13-14; "the 
MAY AGUEZ was in direct violation of the Treaty [by] carrying military cargo and supplies into 
Cambodian waters," id. at 18, lines 7-8; "the MAYAGUEZ was in violation of the supreme law 
of our land under the solemn Treaty existing between the United States and Cambodia and as 
defined under the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2," id. at 4, lines 14-18. In 
federal court, the plaintiffs alleged that "the President acted negligently in the exercise of his 
power, arguing that Cambodia's seizure of the Mayaguez in its territorial waters did not violate 
international law," Memorandum of Opinion and Order, supra note 8, at 7, lines 22-25. 
18. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5 at 4, lines 19-22. 
19. See e.g., Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Ille.t:al Weapons? A Conf~l(urative Approach to Decision 
Integrating International and Domestic Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L..J. 19 (1977), and cases cited; and 
Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 
(1975). See also The Ringeisen Case, European Court of Human Rights (Jun. 22, 1972), reprinted 
in 11 INT'L L. MAT. 1062 (1972); and Paust, Book Review, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. (1980). However, 
plaintiffs may have intended to argue automatic recovery. See Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference 
Statement, supra note 5, at 18, lines 4-10 (recovery "as a matter of law"). 
20. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 5, lines 9-10. 
21. See note 19 supra. 
• 
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lawsuits seemed merely to involve the incorporation of international legal 
standards into claims in admiralty law, 22 although other lawsuits against the 
United States are still pending. 23 
In their federal suits, the plaintiffs alleged that the U. S. Government" was 
negligent in the performance of [its 1 undertaking [to rescue the crew 1 in using 
force of arms, instead of resort to existing treaty law and the use of the judicial 
process or other available peaceful means under domestic and international 
law."24 The plaintiffs further alleged that the United States "was also 
negligent in the manner of performance of its rescue undertaking.' '25 In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs argued that in view of relevant treaty and other interna-
tional law, "the defendant was negligent in assuming that the arrest and 
detention of the Mayaguez was unlawful in the first place.' '26 In support of 
these allegations, the plaintiffs set forth some of the basic elements of fact and 
law which supported their conclusion that Cambodia's seizure of the Mayaguez 
was legally defensible and that several aspects of the U. S. response were legal-
ly impermissibleY Various scholars have indicated their support of these or 
similar legal conclusions. 28 
The use of international legal standards in suits in admiralty is not entirely 
new, especially with regard to the conduct of vessels and with regard to the 
rights to vessel or cargo control and ownership.29 International law has also 
22. See Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 9, lines 12-19. 
23. See note 8 supra. 
24. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, at 4, lines 5-9, Rappennecker v. United States, Nos. 
C-76-0298-WWS, C-76-0422-WWS, C-77-0565-WWS, C-77-0939-WWS, (N.D. Cal., filedJul. 
8, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Opening Brief]. 
25. /d. lines 9-10. See id. at 7-10, citing, Paust, Seizure, supra note 1. 
26. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, supra note 24, at 7, lines 8-9. 
27. See id. at 7-10 . 
28. See the articles cited in notes 1-3 supra. See alsll the following more recently published ar-
ticles: Friedlander, The Mayaguez in Retrospect: Humanitarian Intervention or Showing the Flag?, 22 
ST.LOUIS U. L.J. 601 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Friedlander]; Rubin, Revolution and Self-Defense at 
Sea, 7 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 101,123 (Greece 1977); Fried, War-Exclusive or War-Inclusive Style 
in International Conduct, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 49-60 (1976); Sohn, letter to the author (Nov. 29, 
1976); Fisher, REMARKS. 70 PROC. A.S.I.L. 136 (1976). With regard to constitutional problems 
posed by President Ford's reaction, see the writings listed in Friedlander, supra, at 612 n. 71. The 
author is not opposed to the use of reasonably necessary and proportionate force (e.g., self-help) 
where the circumstances justify such a limited responsive action. See Paust, Entebbe and Self-Help: 
the Israeli Response to Terrorism, 2 THE FLETCHER FORUM 86 (1978). Such is also relevant to legal 
inquiry into the propriety of the abortive U.S. rescue mission in Iran. 
29. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 
and 167 (1895); United States v. Steever, 113 U.S. 747 (1885); Cushing v. Laird 107 U.S. 69, 
76-77,80-81 (1882); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-188 (1871); The China, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 53 (1868); Ramsey v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 623 (1827); The Nereide, 13 
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 4211f (1815); The Betsey and Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443 (1808); 
Croudson v. Leonard, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 434 (1808); Jennings v. Carson, 8 U. S. (4 Cranch) 2, 
19 (1807); The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 
(No. 1607) (D. S.C. 1795); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 Fed. Cas. 942 (No. 9895) (D. Pa. 1793). See 
also Bourguignon, Incorporation of the Law of Nations During the American Revolution - The Case of the 
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served as a basis for exposition of jurisdictional competence. 30 Moreover, the 
payment of money damages to ship or cargo owners for violations of interna-
tionallaw is not unknown. 31 Claims made by a state on behalf of its nationals 
for illegal seizures of a ship and/or cargo have also been successful. 32 
However, the incorporation of relevant international legal standards into the 
claims of crew members for compensation for injuries sustained seems fairly 
noveP3 and the Mayaguez lawsuits are significant precedents in that regard. 
Further, it is not unusual to discover the integration of treaty standards and 
admiralty law in connection with suits in admiralty which arise out of the colli-
sion of two or more vessels at sea. 34 Even negligence standards are involved in 
such cases. 35 Nevertheless, typically in such cases the relevant treaty law and 
agreed norms derived from international maritime conferences36 are created 
San Antonio, 71 AM.]. INT'L L. 270 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bourguignon); Dickinson, The 
Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792 (1953) 
[hereinafter cited as Dickinson); Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 
AM.]. INT'L L. 239 (1932). 
30. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 
(1963); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Farrell v. U.S., 336 U.S. 511 (1949); U.S. v. 
Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-159 (1933); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923); In 
re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887). See also H. STEINER & D. 
VAGTS, TRl\NSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 551 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STEINER & VAGTS); 
The Amelia, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 40-41 (1801); Talbot v.]ansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-161 
(1795). 
31. See Bourguignon, supra note 29, at 292 (upon review of admiralty decision in the case ofthe 
San Antonio, reversal and award of trial and appellate costs plus $ 1,000 damages for illegal deten-
tion and capture); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1900); The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 64, 125-126 (1804). 
32. See, e.g., Hoff, Administratrix (United States v. United Mexican States), General Claims 
Commission (1929), IV U.N. REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 44 (1952) (award of $5,000 with 6% in-
terest from Apr. 24, 1884). 
33. Two relevant cases are known, although they were based on claims by aliens. See Lopes v. 
Reederie Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963), involving a possible dismissal of 
an alien's claim for relief under 28 U.S.C.A. §1350 (tort committed against alien in violation of 
international law) unless plaintiff agreed to transfer the case to the admiralty docket. The court 
concluded that one of the doctrines utilized by plaintiff, the doctrine of "unseaworthiness," is not 
a doctrine of international law but an American court-developed doctrine applied in admiralty. 
The court also held that: "[ n)othing has been found to indicate that the acts or omissions describ-
ed as the negligence in this Complaint would be considered as a violation of the law of nations." 
!d. at 297. The court also noted the case of Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarer's International 
Union, 278 F.2d 49,52 (2d Cir. 1960), which denied a claim that the picketing of a foreign vessel 
while it is within a U.S. port constitutes a tort in violation of international law. 
34. See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 489-512 (2 ed. 1975), and 
cases cited. 
35. See id. at 508-11. 
36. See id. at 489, 825, 987, 990. In this regard one must not forget, of course, the historic in-
terconnections between the general law maritime and the law of nations. See also STEINER & 
VAGTS, supra note 30; Dickinson, supra note 29; C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14-15 (1972); 
The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868); Petition of Gulf Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911,914 
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); Mangone v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 848, 854 
(E.D.N.Y. 1957). 
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for a particular purpose - i. e., application to collision cases. The suits by the 
Mayaguez crew members utilizing international law as a basis for a showing of 
negligence or dereliction vis-a-vis the crew, involved a far broader integration 
of international and admiralty law. Thus, for this additional reason, the 
Mayaguez lawsuits are unique and important. 
III. LOCATION OF THE SHIP 
Depositions of various crew members disclosed that the Mayaguez was 1.75 
miles off the coast of an island under Cambodian control and thus within ter-
ritorial waters claimed by Cambodia. The legal analysis of Cambodia's right 
to stop and search the Mayaguez does not depend upon whether the Mayaguez 
was 6 miles or 1. 75 miles off the coast. This is true because in either case, the 
ship was within a claimed 12 mile territorial sea. Indeed, Cambodia would 
have had such a right under the circumstances even had the Mayaguez been on 
the high seasY However, the disclosure that the ship was actually 1. 75 miles 
from the relevant island is significant for two reasons. 
First, the disclosure places additional doubt on the Captain's assertions that 
the Mayaguez was merely engaged in "innocent passage" as a cargo vessel and 
that no espionage equipment or military cargo of use to insurgents in their 
military actions against Cambodia was on board the Mayaguez at the time of its 
seizure. Second, the fact that the Mayaguez was within 1.75 miles of an island 
in Cambodian control, far closer than the original announcement, makes 
Cambodian suspicion, under the circumstances, even more reasonable. 38 
Moreover, the fact that the Mayaguez was within 1.75 miles of a claimed Cam-
bodian island placed it well outside any international shipping lanes. 39 
Allegations that the Mayaguez passed dangerously close to the island were 
made public shortly after the incident by the statement of a crew member, 
Americo Faria. Mr. Faria stated that he had passed the island many times 
previously aboard another vessel and had never observed the island from as 
close a distance. 4o To substantiate the fact that the Mayaguez was within 1.75 
37. Compare Paust, Seizure, supra note 1 and Paust, Correspondence, supra note 3, with Sandler, 
supra note 2. The Government's answer of January 28, 1980 admitted that the United States 
knew of earlier Cambodian claims to a 12-mile territorial sea and "that Cambodia had claimed 
sovereignty over Poulo Wai for a long time though it is understood that the first written claim was 
made in July 1972." Government's Answer, supra note 13, at 7, lines 17-19, 28-30. The Govern-
ment also admitted that it knew that Cambodia had actually occupied Poulo Wai, at least since 
"late April 1975." See id. at 8, lines 8-10. 
38. See Paust, Seizure, supra note 1, at 785-9:>; Paust, Correspondence, supra note 3, at 209-10. For 
the Federal District Court's finding offact, see Memorandum of Opinion and Order, supra note 8. 
39. Compare Sandler, supra note 2, at 203 with Paust, Correspondence, supra note 3, at 209. See text 
accompanying note 40 irifra (a crew member had never been so close to the island before); and the 
court finding, Memorandum of Opinion and Order, supra note 8. 
40. See R. ROWAN, THE FOUR DAYS OF MAYAGUEZ 24-25 (1975). 
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miles from the relevant island, the attorney for the plaintiffs, Martin J. Jarvis, 
offered the depositions of a crew member and the shipowner's Marine 
Manager. 
The deposition of the crew member, Darryl Kastl, is instructive: 
A. He had no business being close to an island that was seized 
by the Cambodians. 
Q. How close was he? 
A. In my estimate, approximately two miles. 
Q. Were you on deck at the time of the seizure? 
A. I was looking out my porthole. H 
The admission of Captain Miller, the Mayaguez Captain, contained in the 
deposition of the shipowner's Marine Manager was even more precise: 
Q. Did he mention how close he was to the Cambodian-claimed 
island of Poulo Wai when the ship was seized? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say in that regard? 
A. I think he said he was about 1.75 miles from the island when he 
was fired upon ... 
A. I asked him how close he had approached the island. 
Q. All right, and his answer was what? 
A. 1.75 miles ... Y 
Plaintiffs also produced an expert who "examined the original gyroscope 
course recorder tracings of the" Mayaguez, "the ship's deck log, engine log, 
bell book and the radio log, as well as the official government charts and data 
on prevailing tides and weather conditions. . . .' '43 The conclusion of the ex-
pert was that the M ayaguez "was 2.2 miles off the islands of Poulo Wai when 
seized and detained (plus or minus a possible error of half a mile) .... ' '44 
41. Deposition of Darryl V. Kastl, .luI. 3, 1976, at 11, lines 5-10, Rappennecker v. Sea-Land 
Services, Inc., No. 691-717, consolidated with 691-718,719,720,721 and 695-952 (Cal. Super. 
Ct., filed Apr. 26, 1977). 
42. Deposition of Harold D. Simmons, Feb. 26,1976, at 121, lines 11-16; id. at 131, line 28, 
to id. at 132, line 2, Rappennecker v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., No. 691-717, consolidated with 
691-718,719,720,721 and 695-952 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 26, 1977). For the federal court's 
finding, see Memorandum of Opinion and Order, supra note 8. The plaintiffs were also going to 
offer the ship's log in evidence to show that the Mayaguez must have been within 2 miles of the 
island. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 2, lines 13-16, also cited the 
depositions of two other crew members to support this claim: Deposition of Frank Conway, .luI. 
28, 1975; and Deposition of C..J. Harrington, .luI. 17, 1977. See also text accompanying notes 
43-44 infra. The Captain also admitted in an affidavit that the ship "passed within 3 miles of the 
Cambodian islands of Poulo Wai." Affidavit of Charles T. Miller, Apr. 24, 1980, at 8, lines 
30-31. 
43. Affidavit of Henrik E. Sievers, Master Mariner, Jan. 11, 1980, at 3, lines 2-7, Rappen-
necker v. United States, Nos. C-76-0298-WWS, C-76-0422-WWS, C-77-0565-WWS, 
C-77-0939-WWS (N.D. Cal., filedJul. 8, 1980). 
44. !d. at 3, lines 7-10. 
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IV. ApPEARANCE OF THE SHIP 
The general appearance of the Mayaguez is also relevant to the 
reasonableness of Cambodia's suspicion under the circumstances and its right 
to stop the Mayaguez, whether on the high seas or in territorial waters. 
Although several relevant facts were previously known about the appearance 
of the ship,45 the plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement stressed the fact, 
now nearly admitted by the U.S. Government, that the Mayaguez was painted 
black and flying no flag at the time of seizure. 46 Such facts were stressed by the 
plaintiffs to show negligence, dereliction and reckless misconduct. The facts 
also lend support to the reasonableness of Cambodia's suspicion. 
Of particular importance is the fact that the Mayaguez was showing no flag. 
Such a fact is a primary justification for the stopping of any merchant vessel in 
the territorial sea of a coastal state47 and, more importantly, anywhere upon 
the high seas. 48 For example, in 1977, a freighter, the Juliana I, was detained 
some 120 miles east-north east of Boston by the U.S. Coast Guard because it 
did not display a flag. ~9 After ordering the Juliana to stop, the Coast Guard 
boarded the Juliana to determine nationality and proper documentation. 
45. Ste Paust, Seizure, supra note 1, at 792-794; and Paust, Correspondence, supra note 3, at 
209·10. 
46. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 7, lines 6-7. This was admit-
ted in part by the Government. See Government's Answer, supra note 13. The ship might have 
been painted black so as to be able to run closer to the shore without lights (or "blacked out") 
and avoid being discovered. Set also Deposition of Wilbert Bock, Mar. 4, 1977, at 128, lines 
21-24; id. at 130, lines 14-19, Rappennecker v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., No. 691-717, con-
solidated with 691-718, 719, 720, 721 and 695-952 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 26, 1977). 
47. See Paust, Correspondence, supra note 3, at 209. 
48. See 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 22(2),450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 
2312 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas]; and 4 WHITEMAN. DIGEST 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 667 (1965) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN1 (right of approach and 
verification). Set also C. COLOMBOS. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OFTHE SEA 291-292,496 (6th ed. 
1967); A. HIGGINS & C. COLOMBOS. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 3440 (2nd ed. 1951); 
M.S. McDoUGAL & W.T. BURKE. THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1085-86, 1121 (1962). 
The general "burden of proof' or justifying factor for detention is reasonable suspicion. See 
WHITEMAN, supra; and Article 22(1), 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra 
(reasonable ground for suspecting). When the Mayaguez showed no flag there was no question 
about the right of Cambodia to approach and attempt verification. The reasonable suspicion 
standard is the same general standard utilized in cases of detention in the territorial sea, a con-
tiguous zone or on the high seas, when the legal ground relates to noninnocent passage or general 
self-defense measures (i.e., measures other than the alternative justification for detention of the 
Mayagutz, the right of verification). See Paust, Seizure, supra note 1, at 786-791, and authorities 
cited therein; id. at 793 n.91; Paust, Correspondence, supra note 3, at 209-210, and authorities cited 
at 210 n.20; Burke, Contemporary Law of the Sta: Transportation, Communication and F/~f(ht, 2 YALE 
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 183, 186-88,203-04,209-14 (1976); Slonim,The Right of Innocent 
Passage and the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5 COLUM . .1. TRANSNAT'L L. 96, 100-02 
(1966); 4 WHITEMAN. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 346 (1965); Re Martinez, Italian Court of 
Cassation (1959), 28 INT'L L. REP. 170 (1963), reprinted in N. LEECH. C. OLIVER, &.1. SWEENEY. 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 184-88 (1973). 
49. Set U.S. COAST GUARD. COMMANDANT'S BULLETIN. No. 40-77, at 4 (Oct. 3, 1977). The 
vessel raised the Honduran flag just after the Coast Guard ordered the vessel to stop. 
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While below, in an attempt to observe the main beam number (for identifica-
tion purposes), the Coast Guard personnel discovered some 25.5 tons of mari-
juana, one of the largest marijuana seizures ever made by the Coast Guard. 
The Coast Guard did obtain the consent of the Honduran Government, 
through the U.S. Department of State, to take appropriate law enforcement 
action. 50 Significantly, however, the initial stopping of the vessel to verify its 
nationality was perfectly proper under Article 22, paragraphs (1) (c) and (2) of 
the 1958 Geneva Convention oh the High Seas. 51 
V. THE SECRET CARGO 
On board the Mayaguez at the time of its seizure were 274 containers. 
The contents of these containers have never been disclosed. However, it is 
known that the Mayaguez left Saigon nine days before the capital of South Viet-
nam fell, that the Captain of the Mayaguez destroyed a secret code upon cap-
ture, and that there was an $800 mini-computer on board in addition to radar 
and radio equipment. 52 These disclosures fueled suspicion that the Mayaguez 
was somehow involved in espionage activity and/or the carriage of military 
equipment of use in armed activities against Cambodia. Disclosures pursuant 
to the Mayaguez lawsuits have intensified these suspicions. 
Several of the 35 foot, 25 ton containers were picked up in Saigon under 
special circumstances (e.g., with escort. by Embassy personnel) nine days 
before Saigon fell. These containers housed secret data and other material 
from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and were loaded on board as "ad-
ministrative material. "53 It is still not known where or when these secret con-
tainers were off-loaded or what they actually contained. Such facts were not 
disclosed in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs pressed for full disclosure and 
had obtained some information prior to the settlement of the first set of 
lawsuits. 54 However, it is known that the Mayaguez carried several other con-
.'lO. ld. This apparently took place while the search proceeded. The detention lasted from 
September 12 until September 14 when the Juliana was escorted to Boston. 
51. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 48, art. 22. 
52. See Paust, Seizure, supra note I, at 793-94 n.91; Paust, Co"espondence, supra note 3, at 210 
n.23. The Government has admitted at least that "an Alpha envelope had been issued to the 
Master of the Mayaguez ... with instructions that it be opened only under certain 
circumstances." See Government's Answer, supra note 13, at 15, lines 17-19. 
53. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 30, lines 13-15; id. at 33, lines 
15-17, citing Depositions of Captain Charles T. Miller, Nov. 24-25, 1975 and Dec. 22, 1975; 
Deposition of Timothy T. Titus (Sea-Land Country Manager, Vietnam), Apr. 29, 1976; Deposi-
tion of John Vanna, Apr. 12-13, 1977; Deposition of Cpt. David D. Partridge, Apr. 19, 1977; 
and N.Y.Times, May 23, 1975, at 3, col. 3 (West German Magazine Asserts Mayaguez Carried 
C.I.A. Data). The containers were 35 feet long, 8 feet wide and 8.5 feet high. See JANE, FREIGHT 
CONTAINERS 1972-1973292 (5th ed. 1973). 
54. See Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 13-16; id. at 30, lines 
13-15; id. at 46, lines 8-13. Still today, many relevant facts are unavailable to Congress since they 
are classified. See Paust, Co"espondence, supra note 3, at 207. 
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tainers with military cargo and military supplies destined for the U.S. airbase 
in Sattahip, Thailand, as it and other Sea-Land vessels had done in the past. 55 
A Sea-Land official, Michael McEvoy, stated shortly after the incident that 
the Mayaguez carried "107 containers of routine cargo, 77 containers of 
military cargo, and 90 empty containers. "56 No mention was made of the 
secret Embassy containers, but the admission that 77 military containers ex-
isted is relevant. Further, the partial cargo list furnished to the plaint:'ffs by 
defendant Sea-Land Corporation. included seventeen containers labeled as 
"cannot identify - all going to AAFES, but contents cannot be identified," 
two containers labeled as "general cargo," and six containers labelled as "six 
additional loads from the U.S. East Coast ... it is believed one was loaded at 
Baltimore, 3 at Norfolk/Portsmouth, and 2 at Elizabeth. "57 
Also disclosed was the surreptitious off-loading of several containers at 
Singapore after release of the Mayaguez and before actual inspection of any 
container by the public. The depositions taken by plaintiffs disclosed the 
following sequence of events relevant to the overall mystery and the off-
loading process: 
There were 274 cargo containers aboard the MAY AGUEZ 
when she was seized in the Gulf of Thailand on 12 May 1975. 
After release from capture by Cambodia, the vessel did not pro-
ceed on her scheduled run to Sattahip, but was rerouted to 
Singapore where certain of her cargo containers (which had been 
on board at the time of vessel seizure) were off-loaded at Singapore. 
Thereafter, while still at Singapore the World Press was invited by 
the Chairman of the Board of Sea-Land Service, Inc., to inspect 
the contents of the cargo containers then remaining on board the 
MA YAGUEZ. No inspection of the actual contents of the 
MAY AGUEZ cargo containers (either those containers which had 
55. See Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 13, lines 10-17; id. at 16, 
lines 9-18, citing a partial cargo list supplied by the Sea-Land defendant; see also Government's 
Answer, supra note 13, at 4, lines 20-24. The partial cargo list included "radio transmitter sets," 
"electrical equipment," numerous chemicals and other military equipment. These were 
"suspect" cargoes under a previously established United States-South Vietnamese practice, en-
forcing the Viet-Nam Decree on Sea Surveillance for security and defense purposes. See Paust, 
Seizure, supra note 1, at 788-89. 
56. San Francisco Chronicle, Jun. 29, 1975; See G.A.O Report, infra note 61, at 127. 
57. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, Exhibit K (May 15,1975). This 
cargo list was" authenticated by Mr. Gilbertson under judicial oath." See Affidavit of Martin J . 
Jarvis in Support of Jurisdiction Oan. 17, 1980), at 4, lines 1-5, Rappennecker v. United States, 
Nos. C-76-0298-WWS, C-76-0422-WWS, C-77-0565-WWS, C-77-0939-WWS (N.D. Cal., filed 
Jul. 8, 1980). Mr. Gilbertson was the President and Chief Operating Officer for the defendant 
Sea-Land. There was no mention of "administrative material" from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon 
in the partial list of cargo. In answers to plaintiff interrogatories in the federal action, Attorney 
William Gwatkin, a U.S. Attorney, denied that an Embassy cargo (of some 34 containers) was on 
board the Mayo.guez at the time of its seizure. See Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, Jun. 30, 
1977, at 2, lines 1-5, Rappennecker v. United States, Nos. C-76-298-LHB, C-76-422-LHB 
(N.D. CaL). 
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been off-loaded or those remaining aboard the ship) was infact ac-
tually made at Singapore. 
Additional new containers were onloaded before the vessel 
departed Singapore for Hong Kong. Upon arrival Hong Kong the 
Press was invited to inspect the then cargo container contents of 
the MA YAGUEZ. Only 6 out of the 274 containers "from the 
stacked deck" (an expression on the ancient game of poker by 
Hoyle) were in fact opened at random at Hong Kong. 58 
The German magazine Stem reported that the Mayaguez was carrying con-
tainers of top-secret intelligence data as well as all the electronic equipment 
(including radio and decoding equipment) from two former C.I.A. offices in 
Saigon. However, the U.S. Government has refused to admit such allega-
tions. Ron Nessen of the White House staff denied that the containers held 
"classified C.I.A. material of any kind."59 Similarly, the corporate defen-
dants proved to be evasive. 60 The world may never know exactly what was in-
side all of the containers. Perhaps if Stem was correct that the United States 
went after the cargo, and apparently not the crew at all, then the U.S. mission 
was relatively successful. 61 In contrast, the efforts of the plaintiffs to learn 
about the contents of the conainers were relatively in vain. 
VI. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF HOSTILITIES 
Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement claimed that widely circulated 
"national and international magazines including Time and Newsweek, the con-
tents of which were known to the defendant's operating personnel and the 
58. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 15, lines 1-18, citing Deposi-
tions of Michael McEvoy (Apr. 29, 1977) and Don O'Hare (Mar. 30, 1977), two Sea-Land ex-
ecutives (one of whom was also on the Executive Committee of R.J. Reynolds Industries, inc., 
the parent corporation of defendant Sea-Land). in F. Houk, The Mayaguez Incident (Feb. 1977) 
(unpublished student thesis at the University of North Carolina Library), Mr. Houk posits a 
U.S. intelligence connection to the Mayaguez through the R.J. Reynolds Co. to Sea-Land, 
although the only apparent" proof' offered is the fact that Gordon Gray, on the Board of Direc-
tors of R.J. Reynolds, has been actively involved in military intelligence during his career, has 
worked indirectly with the C.I.A., and has for sixteen years been on the President's Foreign in-
telligence Advisory Board. !d. at 78-83. 
59. See N.Y. Times, May 23, 1975 at 3, col. 3 (West German Magazine Asserts Mayaguez 
Carried C.I.A. Data). The GAO was "unable to confirm" many relevant facts because they are 
still classified and unavailable to the U.S. Congress. See Paust, Comspondence, supra note 3, at 207. 
60. See Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 14, lines 1-3, 13-23. 
61. See N.Y. Times, May 23, 1975 at 3, col. 3 (West German Magazine Asserts Mayaguez 
Carried C.I.A. Data). Stern also reported that frogmen had set mines under the ship before the 
crew was moved to the mainland and that the United States would have destroyed the ship had 
aerial reconnaissance showed that Cambodians were opening containers. ld in this regard, it 
may be relevant that U.S. reconnaissance was directed (at least twice during nighttime missions) 
to measure spaces between the containers aboard the Mayaguez. See SUBCOMM. ON iNTERNA· 
TIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELA· 
TIONS, 94th CONG., 2D SESS., REPORTS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL ON THE SEIZURE OF THE 
MAYAGUEZ 77 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as G.A.O. Report]. See also note 69 infra. 
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Master of the MA YAGUEZ, "62 had published news accounts of intense 
hostilities between Vietnamese and Cambodian forces as well as Thai fishing 
boats that had occurred in the general area for several months prior to the 
seizure of the Mayaguez. Indeed, the defendant Sea-Land had ordered all of its 
vessels to stay at least twenty nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam and rele-
vant islands. 63 Moreover, the U.S. Government "Sailing Directions" (dated 
1957 through 1976) had warned that vessels were "subject to search" within 
the limit of twelve nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam and that general 
vicinity. 64 
The plaintiffs also alleged that Sea-Land had specifically warned the Cap-
tain of the Mayaguez on several occasions just prior to the seizure to give wide-
berth to armed fishing boats, and further that the Captain had been specifical-
ly warned to avoid shell fire around Poulo Wai: 
The Master of the MA Y AG UEZ prior to departure Hong Kong 
on May 9, 1975 ... had been specifically warned ... regarding 
reports of actual shellfire between Vietnamese watercraft and 
Cambodian vessels, in the vicinity of the off-lying islands of Cam-
bodia including Poulo Wai. 66 
It is also clear that other crew members had known about the general dangers 
in those waters. 67 The unanswered question is why the Mayaguez, knowing of 
the dangers involved, was 1.75 miles from the Poulo Wai islands at the time it 
was spotted by the Cambodians. 68 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Mayaguez lawsuits in admiralty have added much to our knowledge of 
important facts that relate to the reasonableness of Cambodian suspicion and 
62. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 2, lines 4-8, 17-22. The 
magazine articles are listed in Plaintiffs' Exhibit B. /d. See id. at 50, lines 13-24; id. at 51, lines 5-9 
(personally known to Cpt. Miller and Sea-Land) citing numerous depositions; id. at 52-53. With 
regard to such knowledge and, most likely, nautical guidelines issued by both Sea-Land and the 
U.S. Government, see notes 63-64 infra, the Government's answer seems to be: "Some of the in-
formation sought in this request is classified, is regarded as sensitive, and has not been 
declassified." See Government's Answer, supra note 13, at 8-9; hut see id. at 12-13 concerning ad-
missions with regard to knowledge of the seizure of, or incidents involving, at least fifteen vessels 
from May 2 to May 7, 1975 (i.e., from 10 to 5 days prior to the seizure of the Mayaguez). 
63. Plaintiffs' Settlement Conference Statement, supra note 5, at 37, lines 18-24; id. at 38, lines 
3-6; id. at 5, lines 11-14, 21-26 (Sea-Land had approved the Master's venturing into hostile 
waters); id. at 26, lines 4-14; id. at 38, lines 1-6. See also id. at 46, line 14, to 47, line 9. 
64. See id. at 37, lines 18-24; id. at 46, lines 14-18. See a/so id. at 53, lines 1-6 (additional specific 
warnings). 
65. /d. at 52, lines 1-8, 19-24. 
66. [d. at 52, lines 9-15, citing "per Harold Simmons - Sea-Land Marine Manager-Southeast 
Asia, stationed at Hong Kong." See Deposition of Harold Simmons, Feb. 26, 1976, at 42-47. 
67. See Paust, Seizure, supra note I, at 795 n.94; Deposition of Frank Conway,Jul. 28,1975, at 
59; Deposition of Wilbert Bock, Mar. 3-4,1977, at 122,127-29. 
68. Cj R. ROWAN. THE FOUR DAYS OF MAYAGUEZ 17 (1975) (off course). 
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the right of Cambodia to approach the Mayaguez, stop the ship and conduct a 
search of the vessel. The disclosures about the actual location of the Mayaguez 
(1. 75 miles off a claimed Cambodian island and outside any international 
shipping lanes) as well as the disclosures related to the appearance of the vessel 
(without any flag), the still-secret cargo and the knowledge of the U.S. 
Government, Sea-Land, the Captain and some crew members concerning the 
hostilities in the general area, specifically ihcluding the Poulo Wai islands, are 
particularly relevant. 
Someday historians may learn even more about the secret cargo and 
whether the Ford Administration actually sought to recapture tke cargo in 
disregard of the actual safety and lives of the crew. On this point it is at least 
clear that the Administration thought that the crew had been transferred to the 
Cambodian mainland. 69 In addition, until the contents of each of the 274 con-
tainers is revealed, speculation that the containers housed new, sophisticated 
espionage equipment to monitor coastal activities in the "post-Pueblo" era of 
intelligence gathering seems appropriate. The Mayaguez lawsuits did not shed 
much additional light on such a question. The same is true of the evasiveness 
of the Sea-Land Corporation and the numerous "classified fact" refusals of 
the Executive branch in response to G.A.D., Congressional and private in-
quiry. Thus, the actual cargo and mission of the Mayaguez remain an intrigu-
ing mystery. 70 
69. See Paust, Seizure, supra note 1, at 779-80, 800-01. See also G.A.O. Report, supra note 61, at 
75-76. The Government now admits "that U.S. military aircrafts attempted to prevent the 
removal of the crew-members of the Mayo.guez to shore by firing warning shots and dropping riot 
control agents near the Cambodian vessels." See Government's Answer, supra note 13, at 20, 
lines 13-19. 
70. In response to a request for the exact inventory of containers, the Attorney in Charge 
(West Coast Admiralty and Shipping Section, U.S. Department of Just ice ) stated "that the infor-
mation was classified, quite sensitive .... " Letter to the author from plaintiffs' attorney M. Jar-
vis (Nov. 8, 1977). In the Government's answer to a broad question about the cargo and 
hostilities between Vietnam and Cambodia, the Government responded: "The information 
sought in this request is classified, is regarded as sensitive, and has not been declassified to date. 
Thus defendant is unable to respond to this request." See Government's Answer, supra note 13, at 
9, lines 3-14. 
